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BEEFING UP SKINNY LA BELS: INDUCED
INFRINGEMENT AS A QU ESTION OF LAW
Garrett T. Potter*
INTRODUCTION
The cost of pharmaceuticals has a massive influence on the
healthcare system. The global pharmaceutical industry had a revenue
of $1.27 trillion in 2020, with revenue of sales in North America
accounting for approximately half of that.1 This colossal market is seen
as a burden to many, and a majority of United States citizens shows
unified support for decreasing the price of drugs.2 Government
officials from both Democratic and Republican parties have floated
plans to decrease the cost of healthcare by incorporating more use of
generic drugs which would serve as competition to brand drug
manufacturers that otherwise retain a monopoly on the drug market.3
* Candidate for J.D., Notre Dame Law School, 2023; Ph.D. in Chemistry, The
University of Manchester, 2015; B.S. in Biochemistry/Chemistry, University of California
San Diego, 2007. I would like to thank Professor Sean B. Seymore for his feedback
throughout the many steps of drafting this Note, Professor Jay Tidmarsh for his
counterarguments, and my colleagues on Notre Dame Law Review for their edits. I would
like to especially thank my wife, Marjorie, for the mental breaks and moments of Fika, and
for graciously putting up with me going back to school one more time. Enormous thanks
to my family for all of their support. All errors are my own.
1 Matej Mikulic, Global Pharmaceutical Industry—Statistics & Facts, STATISTA (Sept. 10,
2021), https://www.statista.com/topics/1764/global-pharmaceutical-industry/ [https://
perma.cc/T6QP-EGP5]. The generic drug industry itself is a behemoth in the global
marketplace, with the market size estimated at $391 billion in 2020, and projected to rise
to $575 billion by 2027. Generic Drugs Market Size to Reach USD 574.63 Billion by 2027,
PRECEDENCE
RSCH.,
https://www.precedenceresearch.com/generic-drugs-market
[https://perma.cc/3WQH-WCHG]; Global Generic Drugs Market Size, Share, Trends, Growth
& COVID-19 Impact Analysis Report—Segmented by Type (Pure Generic Drugs, Branded Generic
Drugs), Application (Central Nervous System (CNS), Cardiovascular, Dermatology, Oncology,
Respiratory, Others), Region—Industry Report (2021 to 2026), MKT. DATA FORECAST (Apr.
2021), https://www.marketdataforecast.com/market-reports/global-generic-drugs-market
[https://perma.cc/S5KG-KFFJ].
2 Elisabeth Rosenthal, Public Opinion Is Unified on Lowering Drug Prices. Why Are
Leaders Settling for Less?, KHN (Nov. 18, 2021), https://khn.org/news/article/publicopinion-prescription-drug-prices-democratic-plan/ [https://perma.cc/2VZX-LX47].
3 Fact Sheet: President Biden Calls on Congress to Lower Prescription Drug Prices, WHITE
HOUSE (Aug 12, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-
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Brand manufacturers consistently seek to expand their patent
coverage to maintain a monopoly on the market, often with patents
covering particular excipient formulations, dosage regimes,
administration forms, and methods of treatment.4 Periodically, a
brand manufacturer discovers a new method of treatment using a drug
that has already been on the market and seeks patent coverage for that
method of treatment.
One way that generic drug manufacturers are able to compete
with brand manufacturers is through the use of “skinny labels.” Under
the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984, drug manufacturers can introduce a
generic version of a pioneer drug to the market so long as any patented
methods of use or treatment are “carved out” of the drug label, making
it a so-called “skinny label.”5 This allows the generic manufacturer to
produce the drug without directly or indirectly infringing the patented
method of treatment. Such skinny labels remove an average of over
three years’ time from the brand drug manufacturer’s monopoly, with
high-revenue brand-name drugs being a key target.6
The pioneer drug manufacturers, in response, seek other means
of enforcing control over their intellectual property. In 2000,
SmithKline Beecham argued generic manufacturers should not be
able to copy elements of its drug labels because it would be copyright

releases/2021/08/12/fact-sheet-president-biden-calls-on-congress-to-lower-prescriptiondrug-prices/ [https://perma.cc/WM3F-DM96] (“Alongside other steps, the federal
government will be working with states and Tribes to import safe, lower-cost prescription
drugs from Canada and accelerating the development and uptake of generic and biosimilar
drugs that give patients the same exact clinical benefit but at a fraction of the price.”);
Natalie Grover, Republicans Unveil a Drug Price Bill to Rival the Democrats—Promising Lower
Prices and More Cures, ENDPOINTS NEWS (Dec. 10, 2019), https://endpts.com/lower-pricesmore-cures-republicans-pitch-a-utopian-drug-price-bill-to-rival-the-democrats/
[https://
perma.cc/4VNA-5HGZ] (“Some of the proposals in HR19 also mirror policies advocated
by bipartisan legislation currently under consideration in the Senate, including the
CREATES act which is designed to ensure generic drugmakers can access branded drugs to
develop copycats, and prohibits ‘pay-for-delay’ deals, where manufacturers of branded
drugs maintain their monopolies by offering generic companies rewards for delaying the
launch of knockoff products.”).
4 Jan Berger, Jeffrey D. Dunn, Margaret M. Johnson, Kurt R. Karst & W. Chad Shear,
How Drug Life-Cycle Management Patent Strategies May Impact Formulary Management, 22 AM. J.
MANAGED CARE (SUPP.) S487, S487 (2016).
5 See Terry G. Mahn, Generics Behaving Badly: Carve Outs, Off-Label Uses, LAW360 (Mar.
24, 2009), https://www.law360.com/health/articles/93495/generics-behaving-badly-carveouts-off-label-uses [https://perma.cc/NCM6-KJHA]. See generally Drug Price Competition
and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 21, 35, and 42 U.S.C.).
6 Bryan S. Walsh, Ameet Sarpatwari, Benjamin N. Rome & Aaron S. Kesselheim,
Frequency of First Generic Drug Approvals with “Skinny Labels” in the United States, 181 JAMA
INTERNAL MED. 995, 995–96 (2021).
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infringement.7 The Second Circuit held that the Hatch-Waxman Act
trumps copyright law, and SmithKline Beecham’s arguments fell flat.8
Brand manufacturers have also entered “pay-for-delay” agreements in
litigation settlements, essentially paying generic manufacturers to not
compete—potential antitrust issues notwithstanding.9 Pioneer drug
manufacturers have also succeeded in arguing that generic
manufacturers’ labels contribute to indirect infringement of their
patents, including induced infringement.10
Induced infringement “is often described as activity that ‘aids and
abets’ infringement” of a patent.11 It requires that the alleged inducer
have a specific intent to cause acts that constitute infringement, an
affirmative act that induces others to infringe the patent, and that an
act of direct infringement of the patent occur.12 It also requires that
the alleged inducer have actual knowledge of the patent and
knowledge that its affirmative act to induce others would lead to such
direct infringement.13 The determination of whether each element
has been met is currently a question of fact determined in many cases
by a jury.14 This Note will argue that the determination of whether a

7 SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, L.P. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 211 F.3d
21, 23–24 (2d Cir. 2000). SmithKline Beecham would later merge with Glaxo Wellcome to
form GlaxoSmithKline. Alison Abbott, Merger of Glaxo Wellcome and SmithKline Beecham
Creates Pharmaceutical Giant, 403 NATURE 232 (2000).
8 SmithKline Beecham, 211 F.3d at 28–29 (“Our point here is not only that Congress
would have provided explicitly that the Hatch-Waxman Amendments trump the copyright
laws had it foreseen the statutory conflict exposed by the present action, although we firmly
believe that to be obvious.”); see also id. (“If copyright law were to prevail, producers of
generic drugs will always be delayed in—and quite often prohibited from—marketing the
generic product, results at great odds with the purposes of the Hatch-Waxman
Amendments.”).
9 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PAY-FOR-DELAY: HOW DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST
CONSUMERS BILLIONS 1 (Jan. 2010).
10 Preston K. Ratliff II, Mi Zhou & Mark Russell Sperling, Federal Circuit Provides
Additional Guidance for Induced Infringement in Hatch-Waxman Cases, PAUL HASTINGS (Nov.
13, 2017), https://www.paulhastings.com/insights/client-alerts/federal-circuit-providesadditional-guidance-for-induced-infringement-in-hatch-waxman-cases [https://perma.cc
/29CR-L6GC].
11 KIMBERLY PACE MOORE, PAUL R. MICHEL & RAPHAEL V. LUPO, PATENT LITIGATION
AND STRATEGY 19–24 (1999).
12 Id.
13 Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 575 U.S. 632, 640 (2015); Global-Tech
Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 765–66 (2011); DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471
F.3d 1293, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
14 James A. Johnson, Induced Patent Infringement, N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N (Apr. 7, 2020),
https://nysba.org/induced-patent-infringement/
[https://perma.cc/PT7M-253A]
(“Moreover, the low threshold of the scienter requirement that can be established by
inference and circumstantial evidence creates a fact question for a jury to decide.”).
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party actually intended to induce another to infringe the patent should
instead be a question of law.
The influence of induced infringement on the generic
manufacturer landscape and its interactions with skinny labels is best
evidenced by the August 5, 2021, Federal Circuit decision of
GlaxoSmithKline v. Teva (also referred to herein as “GSK v. Teva”).15 In
that case, the Federal Circuit largely affirmed its October 2, 2020,
decision,16 which held that a jury had ample support to find induced
infringement even during periods where Teva had used a skinny label
that carved out the allegedly infringed-upon patent.17 This resulted in
an order that Teva pay GlaxoSmithKline $234 million in damages,
though Teva only sold $74 million worth of the generic drug.18
Criticism to this decision was swift, with many commentators indicating
it was a death knell to the reliance of generic manufacturers on the
safety provided by the practice of skinny labeling.19 In late 2021, Teva

15 GlaxoSmithKline LLC v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 7 F.4th 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2021).
16 GlaxoSmithKline LLC v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 976 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
17 GlaxoSmithKline, 7 F.4th at 1329.
18 GSK v. Teva – Induced Infringement Liability Despite Skinny Label, COOLEY (Oct. 6,
2020),
https://www.cooley.com/news/insight/2020/2020-10-06-gsk-v-teva-inducedinfringement-liability-despite-skinny-label [https://perma.cc/4BES-FQ4L].
19 Paul A. Braier, GlaxoSmithKline v. Teva: Federal Circuit Broadens Induced
Infringement to Preclude Marketing Generics for Off-Patent Indications, 17 J. GENERIC MEDS. 97,
98 (2021); Amy L. Baker, William Tolin Gay & Tawana B. Johnson, The Wide-Ranging Effects
of the Federal Circuit’s Assault on Skinny Labels, NAT’L L. REV. (Dec. 4, 2020), https://
www.natlawreview.com/article/wide-ranging-effects-federal-circuit-s-assault-skinny-labels
[https://perma.cc/2X8Y-8FZC] (“The U.S. Federal Circuit Court of Appeals recently
issued an opinion that effectively strips generic drug manufacturers of the ability to avoid
inducement lawsuits through the use of skinny drug labels. The opinion may have a
significant negative effect on the generic drug industry because it seemingly creates new
liability exposure where none previously existed.”); Dani Kass, GSK Redo Doesn’t Cure
Generics’ ‘Skinny Label’ Uncertainty, LAW360 (Aug. 9, 2021), https://www.law360.com
/articles/1410679/gsk-redo-doesn-t-cure-generics-skinny-label-uncertainty
[https://
perma.cc/66Z9-ZQ77] (“Attorneys said it was hard to see what else Teva could have done
to comply with the law, and that uncertainty could scare generic-drug makers from
bothering with skinny labels. Teva only sold about $74 million of the drug it now owes $235
million for infringing.”); Matthew Lane, Federal Circuit Should Restore Generics ‘Skinny Label’
Process, BLOOMBERG L. (Jan. 12, 2021), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/ip-law/federalcircuit-should-restore-generics-skinny-label-process [https://perma.cc/2YCN-JEVV] (“The
Federal Circuit’s decision in GlaxoSmithKline v. Teva undermines this skinny label
framework by holding that a generic manufacturer who uses a skinny label can still be liable
for induced infringement merely by accurately describing its product as therapeutically
equivalent to the branded drug. This equivalency, a requirement for FDA approval of
generic medicines, is essential safety information for doctors and pharmacists treating their
patients.”); Allie Nawrat, Skinny Labelling of Generics: The Beginning of the End for This
Practice?, PHARM. TECH. (Feb. 15, 2021), https://www.pharmaceutical-technology.com
/features/skinny-labelling-generics-lawsuits/
[https://perma.cc/QR6Z-J8RJ]
(“The
industry is now faced with a ‘precedent finding’ that even a full carve out of the patented
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filed a petition for rehearing en banc before the Federal Circuit
arguing the prior decision would “have a ‘seismic’ impact on the drug
industry,” but a sharply divided Federal Circuit announced in February
2022 that it would not take up the en banc petition.20 While
GlaxoSmithKline contends that Teva is overly alarmist, Teva
announced plans to seek Supreme Court review, and commentators
believe a congressional correction or Supreme Court hearing may be
forthcoming.21
Although the Federal Circuit considered GSK v. Teva to be a
“narrow, case-specific”22 decision, it is nonetheless clear that the
generic drug manufacturing industry is concerned that this will serve
as a basis for similar arguments in the future, and that it will be further
broadened outside the scope of that specific case.
A notable concern of GSK v. Teva was that a jury found induced
infringement to exist where there was little evidence of such, and
substantial evidence suggesting the contrary. The district court judge
granted a motion for JMOL because the judge felt the evidence failed
to support a finding of inducement.23 Notwithstanding the sparse
evidence, the Federal Circuit reversed the motion for JMOL, relying
almost entirely on the supremacy of the jury’s decision and the
categorization of this issue as a question of fact.24 There is, however,
no statutory requirement or instruction from the Supreme Court
indicating that the determination of all elements of inducement are
actually questions of fact. In patent law, what is considered a question
use can lead to induced infringement . . . [and] this case gives brand manufacturers a
‘roadmap’ to challenge generic drugs relying on skinny labelling.”); see also Dennis Crouch,
GSK v. Teva: Skinny Label Approval Is Not a Patent Safe Harbor, PATENTLYO (Aug. 5, 2021),
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2021/08/skinny-approval-patent.html [https://perma.cc
/RC7G-N9Y5].
20 Dani Kass, Teva Says GSK Skinny Label Win Will Have ‘Seismic’ Impact, LAW360 (Oct.
7, 2021), https://www.law360.com/articles/1429343 [https://perma.cc/NXS4-LX25]
(discussing Teva’s en banc filing); Dani Kass, Sharply Split Full Fed. Circ. Won’t Eye Skinny
Label Ruling, LAW360 (Feb. 11, 2022) [hereinafter Kass, Sharply Split], https://
www.law360.com/articles/1464381/ [https://perma.cc/RL67-M8YY] (reporting the
February 11, 2022, denial).
21 Crouch, supra note 19; Susan Decker, Christopher Yasiejko & Ian Lopez, Glaxo’s
Win in Case Against Teva Lifts Other Drugmakers, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 5, 2021), https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-08-05/glaxo-wins-revival-of-235-million-caseagainst-teva-over-coreg [https://perma.cc/XEY2-QCYK]; Britain Eakin, Full Fed. Circ. Told
Teva Overreacting in Skinny Label IP Case, LAW360 (Dec. 7, 2021), https://www.law360.com
/articles/1446435/ [https://perma.cc/EMY5-95S4]; Kass, Sharply Split, supra note 20 (“‘We
are disappointed in this decision and plan to . . . seek Supreme Court review of this
decision . . . ,’ Teva said in a statement Friday.”).
22 GlaxoSmithKline LLC v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 7 F.4th 1320, 1326 (Fed. Cir.
2021).
23 Id. at 1325.
24 Id. at 1330.
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of fact and what is considered a question of law can appear a haphazard
mix with no significant substance or reasoning to guide the wayward
practitioner.25
This Note proposes a novel argument for improving the
application of induced infringement by splitting its elements into
separate questions of fact and law, incorporating the relevant
perception and reasoning of both judge and jury. Part I provides a
primer of the Hatch-Waxman Act and interactions (and lack thereof)
between the USPTO and FDA in regulating pharmaceutical
compositions. Part II assesses the historical landscape that led to the
codification of induced infringement. Part III concludes by proposing
an alternate approach by treating an element of induced infringement
as a question of law, rather than a question of fact, and sets forth the
groundwork enabling the courts to consider it as such.
Although it is important that researching companies recoup costs
in their endeavors to develop novel pharmaceutical agents and
methods of treatment, the finding of induced infringement in GSK v.
Teva took the application of induced infringement too far. Induced
infringement should be found only in those cases where the alleged
perpetrator actually intended to induce such infringement, which is an
understanding more aligned with the fundamentals of patent law and
the protection of intellectual property rights. Expanding the theory of
induced infringement to cover any generic pharmaceutical that has a
new method of treatment will have a chilling effect on the industry,
allowing the brand manufacturer to essentially re-monopolize a
composition that would otherwise be available to the public.
I.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF ANDAS AND SKINNY LABELS

In order to sell a pharmaceutical moiety in the United States, it
must be proven effective for its intended use and safe for human
consumption.26 The process of developing a novel pharmaceutical
from concept to FDA approval will typically cost over $1 billion over
the course of twelve years.27 There is a remarkably high amount of
25 See Paul R. Gugliuzza, Law, Fact, and Patent Validity, 106 IOWA L. REV. 607, 609–10
(2021) (“[T]he distinction between law and fact is one of the most perplexing concepts in
all of law. Some deride the distinction as a myth, and not unreasonably so. . . . The
uncertainty surrounding the law-fact distinction is particularly acute in patent
litigation . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
26 Development & Approval Process: Drugs, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://
www.fda.gov/drugs/development-approval-process-drugs [https://perma.cc/ZKF4-D94J]
(Oct. 28, 2019).
27 Joseph A. DiMasi, Henry G. Grabowski & Ronald W. Hansen, Innovation in the
Pharmaceutical Industry: New Estimates of R&D Costs, 47 J. HEALTH ECON. 20, 20 (2016) (“The
estimated average out-of-pocket cost per approved new compound is $1395 million (2013
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failure that comes with drug development, with more than 90% of
potential drugs failing at some point during the process—the vast
majority meeting failure when issues are found with efficacy or safety—
leading to large losses for the unfortunate drug developer that fails to
get to market.28 Pioneer drug developers argue that a strong patent
system should ensure that researchers recoup their expenses in
bringing a drug to market, as well as money lost in developing drugs
that could not make the cut, as total losses in research and
development.29
The Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984 recognized the importance of
pioneer drug manufacturers’ research and development, and sought
to allow them to recoup such costs. It does so by providing “patent
term restoration” to restore up to five years of time lost during the FDA
approval process, extending patent coverage of the drug.30 The Act
also balances the interests of generic drug manufacturers by allowing
them to enter the drug market so long as their compound does not
infringe a brand manufacturer’s patent.
In seeking to lower costs of pharmaceuticals by providing less
expensive generic products, the Act expedites generic drug approval
through the FDA.31 A generic company can rely on the safety and
efficacy information provided by the original manufacturer of the drug
by filing an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA), resulting in
accelerated FDA approval whereby the drug can be placed on the
market as soon as the original patent on the drug expires.32 Generic
dollars).”); Gail A. Van Norman, Drugs, Devices, and the FDA: Part 1: An Overview of Approval
Processes for Drugs, 1 JACC: BASIC TO TRANSLATIONAL SCI. 170, 171 (2016) (“[T]he drug
development takes on average 12 years from concept to market . . . .”).
28 Derek Lowe, The Latest on Drug Failure and Approval Rates, SCI. (May 9, 2019),
https://www.science.org/content/blog-post/latest-drug-failure-and-approval-rates
[https://perma.cc/9BHS-EA6M].
29 See generally Marcia Angell & Arnold S. Relman, Patents, Profits & American Medicine:
Conflicts of Interest in the Testing & Marketing of New Drugs, DÆDALUS, Spring 2002, at 102.
30 Philip S. Johnson, Hatch Amendment Would Preserve Balanced Incentives for
Pharmaceutical Innovation and Drug Affordability, HEALTH AFFS. BLOG (Nov. 9, 2018), https://
www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20181106.217086/full/
[https://perma.cc
/2LUJ-PU7P]; see WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41114, THE
HATCH-WAXMAN ACT: A QUARTER CENTURY LATER 1 (2012) (“The Hatch-Waxman Act
established several practices intended to facilitate the marketing of generic drugs while
permitting brand name companies to recover a portion of their intellectual property rights
lost during the pharmaceutical approval process.”).
31 SCHACHT & THOMAS, supra note 30, at 1; Baker et al., supra note 19.
32 SCHACHT & THOMAS, supra note 30, at 1; Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA),
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/drugs/types-applications/abbreviatednew-drug-application-anda [https://perma.cc/84K5-FYN7] (Nov. 15, 2021); Baker et al.,
supra note 19 (“Instead of proving the drug’s safety, the generic manufacturer only needs
to prove to the FDA that its product is bioequivalent to the brand-name drug.”); see also
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2018).
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manufacturers are additionally incentivized to promptly file an ANDA
because the first manufacturer to file an ANDA that results in approval
is eligible to receive a 180-day period of exclusivity, during which all
other generic manufacturers are barred from entering the market,
leading to a sizable competitive advantage that continues years
following the approval.33
If a chemical moiety is no longer under patent, and absent any
additional exclusivity period provided by the FDA, then the
composition of matter belongs to the public.34 As described in the
Introduction, pharmaceutical companies will frequently extend the
life of their patent coverage by including additional patented subject
matter beyond the mere drug itself, including formulations and
methods of treatment. In some cases a composition has numerous
therapeutic uses that have been approved by the FDA, but some of
those uses are not covered by a patent. In such instances, a generic
manufacturer producing the nonpatented drug for a nonpatented use
may not be infringing any patent rights of the brand manufacturer.
The Hatch-Waxman Act provided guidance regarding
noninfringing uses. When a pharmaceutical composition is no longer
patented and it has unpatented uses approved by the FDA, then an
ANDA can be filed by using the brand manufacturer’s previously
approved drug label as a basis before “carv[ing] out” any patented
subject matter.35 The resulting “skinny labels” have carved out methods
of treatment covered by any remaining patents, allowing a generic
manufacturer to quickly sell a competing product without
infringement.36 Codified in 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii), this
33 First Generic Drug Approvals, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/drugs
/drug-and-biologic-approval-and-ind-activity-reports/first-generic-drug-approvals [https://
perma.cc/L9Q2-ZN53] (Nov. 17, 2021); First Generic Launch Has Significant First-Mover
Advantage over Later Generic Drug Entrants, DRUGPATENTWATCH, https://
www.drugpatentwatch.com/blog/first-generic-launch-has-significant-first-moveradvantage-over-later-generic-drug-entrants/ [https://perma.cc/V7QP-HK46] (“[T]he first
generic entrant into a market has an 80% market share advantage over the second entrant,
and a 225% market share advantage over the third entrant. Moreover, these advantages last
for at least three years.”).
34 See Frequently Asked Questions on Patents and Exclusivity, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/development-approval-process-drugs/frequently-askedquestions-patents-and-exclusivity [https://perma.cc/HG73-6SPT] (Feb. 5, 2020).
35 Petition for Rehearing En Banc at viii, GlaxoSmithKline LLC v. Teva Pharms. USA,
Inc., 7 F.4th 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (No. 18-976, 18-2023); 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii)
(2018) (“[I]f with respect to the listed drug referred to in clause (i) information was filed
under subsection (b) or (c) for a method of use patent which does not claim a use for which
the applicant is seeking approval under this subsection, a statement that the method of use
patent does not claim such a use.”).
36 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii) (2018); Abraxis Bioscience, Inc. v. Navinta LLC, 625
F.3d 1359, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“As a general rule, the label associated with the generic
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practice of generating a skinny label is also known as a “section viii
carveout.”37
The FDA publishes the Orange Book, which serves to identify
drugs that have been deemed safe and effective.38 While the FDA will
not approve a generic drug that infringes a patent, the Administration
doesn’t determine this itself—it relies on the brand manufacturer to
register any patents that cover a compound or method of use so that
the FDA may incorporate this information into the Orange Book.39 In
turn, generic manufacturers should be able to rely on the Orange
Book and can seek FDA approval by notifying the FDA it will not
infringe any of the patents listed therein.40
The incentives provided by Hatch-Waxman to spur the generic
market have been effective. Prior to the Hatch-Waxman Act, only
approximately 35% of top-selling drugs would get competition from
generic manufacturers once their patents expired; in contrast, nearly
all drugs now face competition from generic manufacturers upon
patent expiration.41 In 2019 alone, more than one thousand ANDAs
were approved or tentatively approved—107 of which were “[f]irst
generic drugs” that would be eligible to receive generic market
exclusivity.42 As of 2018, a full 90% of outpatient prescriptions were for
generic versions of drugs, leading to substantial decreases in
prescription drug costs within the United States.43
Brand drug manufacturers will continue to seek means of
ensuring their market dominance in the face of potential generic
competitors. One common practice is the “pay-for-delay” strategy of

version of a drug must be exactly the same as the label of the branded drug approved in the
original New Drug Application . . . . One exception to the rule under the Hatch-Waxman
Act is if a generic manufacturer makes a ‘Section viii Statement,’ seeking FDA approval for
a use not covered by a method patent listed in the Orange Book, along with a proposed
label that ‘carves out’ the patented method.” (citations omitted)).
37 GlaxoSmithKline LLC, 7 F.4th at 1327.
38 Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations: Orange Book, U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/drugs/drug-approvals-and-databases
/approved-drug-products-therapeutic-equivalence-evaluations-orange-book
[https://
perma.cc/QNZ4-UNT8] (Dec. 10, 2021).
39 ERIN H. WARD, KEVIN J. HICKEY & KEVIN T. RICHARDS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46679,
DRUG PRICES: THE ROLE OF PATENTS AND REGULATORY EXCLUSIVITIES 31 (2021).
40 GlaxoSmithKline LLC v. Teva Pharms., 976 F.3d 1347, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (Prost,
J., dissenting).
41 SCHACHT & THOMAS, supra note 30, at 5, 15.
42 OFF. OF GENERIC DRUGS, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN, 2019 ANNUAL REPORT 2.
43 Steven M. Lieberman, Paul B. Ginsburg & Kavita K. Patel, Balancing Lower U.S.
Prescription Drug Prices and Innovation—Part 1, HEALTH AFFS. BLOG (Nov. 24, 2020), https://
www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20201123.804451/full/
[https://perma.cc
/GW4Z-FRJR]; see also AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, PRESCRIPTION DRUG SPENDING IN THE U.S.
HEALTH CARE SYSTEM: AN ACTUARIAL PERSPECTIVE 6 (2018).
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offering patent settlements to generic manufacturers in return for a
commitment to not compete with them in the market.44 As discussed
in the Introduction, another common strategy is to sue the generic
manufacturer by alleging induced infringement.
II.

A PRIMER ON INDUCED INFRINGEMENT AND APPLICATION TO
GLAXOSMITHKLINE V. TEVA

Part II serves as a primer to induced infringement and analyzes
the court’s application of this doctrine to GSK v. Teva. Section II.A
analyzes the historic roots of induced infringement and delves into the
evolution of the doctrine as it is applied by the courts today. Section
II.B provides a summary of how courts currently apply induced
infringement and the elements required for showing the same.
Section II.C looks into the decision and reasoning of the court in GSK
v. Teva and indicates some potential flaws with the current system for
determining induced infringement.
A. A Brief History of Indirect Infringement
U.S. law recognizes two general categories of patent infringement:
direct infringement and indirect infringement. A patent grants the
right to the patent owner to “exclude others from making, using,
offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States
or importing the invention into the United States.”45 If a party makes,
uses, offers for sale, sells, or imports the invention within the United
States, then they may be liable for direct patent infringement.46 In
contrast, if a party conducts any other actions that lead to a third party
directly infringing a patent, that initial party may be liable for indirect
patent infringement, either under the doctrine of contributory
infringement or the doctrine of induced infringement.47
Induced infringement is a relatively recent development in the
field of patent law. To understand the evolution of induced
infringement, it is beneficial to look behind the veil of how the broader
doctrine of indirect infringement came into being. Historically, the
only ground a patent owner could sue under in seeking relief was an
action of direct infringement. This changed with the 1871 decision of
44 Pay for Delay, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/mediaresources/mergers-competition/pay-delay [https://perma.cc/AWQ7-DDHR].
45 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2018).
46 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2018); 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 16.02
(2012).
47 35 U.S.C. § 271(b)–(c); 5 CHISUM, supra note 46, § 17.04; W. Keith Robinson, Only
a Pawn in the Game: Rethinking Induced Patent Infringement, 32 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.
1, 4 (2015).
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Wallace v. Holmes, which is the earliest known case recognizing the tort
of indirect infringement.48 In Wallace, the doctrine of indirect
infringement was invoked “to protect patent rights from subversion by
those who, without directly infringing the patent themselves, engage
in acts designed to facilitate infringement by others.”49 Indirect
infringement thus provided a common-law “cause of action when
more than one party was involved in the infringement of a patent.”50
It has been recognized that the historical foundations of indirect
infringement included an equitable element, since the issue was “an
expression both of law and morals.”51 Circuit Judge Lourie—a revered
member of the Federal Circuit for over thirty years and having a
background in chemistry52—delved into the historical aspects of
indirect infringement before his appointment to the Federal Circuit,
and also found that the foundational matters of indirect infringement
should consider an assessment of equity.53 For over eighty years
following the Wallace decision, indirect infringement continued as a
matter of common law. In 1952, indirect infringement was finally
codified in two subcategorizations: induced infringement and
contributory infringement.54 This codification sought to reduce the
“[c]onsiderable doubt and confusion as to the scope of” indirect
infringement that resulted from “a number of decisions of the
courts.”55 In codifying contributory and induced infringement,
Congress recognized the moral and equitable aspects of such
infringement, and did not indicate that codification would remove
48 Wallace v. Holmes, 29 F. Cas. 74 (1871); RICHARD T. HOLZMANN, INFRINGEMENT OF
UNITED STATES PATENT RIGHT: A GUIDE FOR EXECUTIVES AND ATTORNEYS 32 (1995)
(“In 1871 appeared the first case clearly recognizing that a person can be held to infringe
by making or selling an unpatented element for use in a patented combination or
process.”).
49 Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 188 (1980) (discussing
Wallace, 29 F. Cas. 74).
50 Robinson, supra note 47, at 7.
51 Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 677 (1944) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
52 Judge Alan D. Lourie to Receive the 2020 American Inns of Court Professionalism Award
for the Federal Circuit, BUSINESSWIRE (May 5, 2020), https://www.businesswire.com/news
/home/20200505005101/en/Judge-Alan-D.-Lourie-to-Receive-the-2020-American-Inns-ofCourt-Professionalism-Award-for-the-Federal-Circuit [https://perma.cc/6MHG-UHEP].
53 Alan D. Lourie, Contributory and Active Inducement of Infringement in Wake of Rohm
and Haas Company v. Dawson Chemical Company, in INFRINGEMENT OF PATENTS 165, 167,
172, 182, 184 (PLI Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks & Literary Property, Course Handbook
Ser. No. 132, 1981). Judge Lourie was working as corporate counsel for a large
pharmaceutical corporation at the time, providing a practical viewpoint in analyzing
induced infringement. Id. at 167; Lourie, Alan David, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov
/history/judges/lourie-alan-david [https://perma.cc/A46L-TSJV].
54 S. REP. NO. 1979, at 6 (1952).
55 Id.
THE
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these considerations.56 Nevertheless, interpretation of the statutes
around indirect infringement has resulted in an apparent removal of
such equitable considerations (as evidenced by the GSK v. Teva
decision, relying entirely upon the jury’s evaluation of factual matters).
This is not to say the interpretation of the statute is clear—indeed,
“[e]ven the Supreme Court has acknowledged that the inducement
statute is ambiguous.”57
The 1952 codification of indirect infringement clearly split the
grounds of indirect infringement—which “recites in broad terms that
one who aids and abets an infringement is likewise an infringer”—and
contributory infringement—“which is concerned with the usual
situation in which contributory infringement arises” and controls, for
example, the sale of components that are a material part of a patented
invention.58 The Federal Circuit has recognized that:
The legislative history of the Patent Act of 1952 indicates that no
substantive change in the scope of what constituted “contributory
infringement” was intended by the enactment of § 271. However,
the single concept of “contributory infringement” was divided
between §§ 271(b) and 271(c) into “active inducement” (a type of
direct
infringement)
and
“contributory
infringement,”
respectively.59

The statutes concerning indirect infringement have not undergone
substantive changes since 1952.60
B. Finding Induced Infringement
When a party conducts “activity that ‘aids and abets’
infringement” of a patent, it is an indication of induced
infringement.61 A showing of induced infringement requires that
three elements are met: (i) direct infringement by a third party has
occurred; (ii) the inducing party had a specific intent to cause said
direct infringement; and (iii) the inducing party does an affirmative
act that so induces the third party to infringe.62 The Supreme Court

56 Id.
57 Robinson, supra note 47, at 5.
58 S. REP. NO. 1979, at 6; 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2018) (the recent codification of induced
infringement); id. § 271(c) (the recent codification of contributory infringement).
59 Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(citations omitted).
60 Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, § 271, 66 Stat. 792, 811 (enacting 35 U.S.C.
§ 271).
61 MOORE ET AL., supra note 11, at 19.
62 Id.; see also Corrected Non-Confidential Joint Appendix Volume I of II at Appx168,
GlaxoSmithKline LLC v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 976 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (No. 18-
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recently held that the specific intent parameter further requires the
alleged inducer have actual knowledge of the patent and knowledge
that its induced act would lead to direct infringement.63
With respect to induced infringement, the United States Code
states that “[w]hoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall
be liable as an infringer.”64 Some logical questions for a practitioner
would be: what constitutes active inducement of infringement, and
what evidence is required for such a showing?
In generic drug manufacturing cases, the Federal Circuit
previously established that, when the brand manufacturer relied on a
generic’s drug label’s instructions along with advertising and
marketing to show intent to actively induce infringement, “[t]he
question is not just whether [those] instructions describ[e] the
infringing mode, . . . but whether the instructions teach an infringing
use such that we are willing to infer from those instructions an
affirmative intent to infringe the patent. The label must encourage,
recommend, or promote infringement.”65 With respect to evidence showing
such active inducement, the Federal Circuit is “of the opinion that
proof of actual intent to cause the acts which constitute the
infringement is a necessary prerequisite to finding active
inducement.”66
C. Active Inducement in GlaxoSmithKline v. Teva
Tying this understanding of active inducement into the GSK v.
Teva decision, that court noted that “[e]vidence of active steps taken
to encourage direct infringement [sic] such as advertising an
infringing use or instructing how to engage in an infringing use, show
1976, -2023) (jury instructions outlining the requirements for a showing of induced
infringement in GlaxoSmithKline v. Teva).
63 Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., 575 U.S. 632, 632 (2015); Global-Tech Appliances,
Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 765–66 (2011). The Federal Circuit has held that inducement
requires encouragement of another’s infringement, and it’s not sufficient to show an
alleged inducer only had knowledge of the direct infringer’s activities. DSU Med. Corp. v.
JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
64 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2018).
65 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Parenteral Meds., Inc. 845 F.3d 1357, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2017)
(alterations in original) (second emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting Takeda
Pharms. U.S.A., Inc. v. West-Ward Pharm. Corp., 785 F.3d 625, 631 (Fed. Cir. 2015));
GlaxoSmithKline LLC v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 7 F.4th 1320, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2021)
(“When a plaintiff relies on a drug’s label accompanying the marketing of a drug to prove
intent, ‘[t]he label must encourage, recommend, or promote infringement.’” (alteration
in original) (quoting Takeda, 785 F.3d at 631)); see also MOORE ET AL., supra note 11, at 19
(“Examples of such active steps include: providing instructions and plans through labels or
advertising that enable the buyer to use the product in an infringing manner.”).
66 Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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an affirmative intent that the product be used to infringe.”67 In the
written opinion, however, there was little critical assessment of whether
Teva’s skinny label instructed a third party how to engage in an
infringing use—instead, the court felt it “must presume the jury found
that Teva” provided “a label that instructed physicians to use it in an
infringing manner.”68
It appears the Federal Circuit is putting the full weight of its
decision on the jury members’ backs, both holding them up as the
ultimate decisionmakers when it comes to the analysis of induced
infringement, as well as the scapegoat upon whom any blame shall lie.
In finding allegedly “substantial evidence support[ed] that Teva
actively induced by marketing a drug with a label encouraging a
patented therapeutic use”69 the court relied on Teva press releases that
predated the ’000 patent (the patent at issue) and advertising materials
which merely noted that Teva’s compound was equivalent to
GlaxoSmithKline’s Coreg (the brand drug at issue).70 The court also
faulted Teva for failing to take down these old press releases once the
’000 patent reissued.71 Equipped with this haphazard assortment of
evidence glued together with GlaxoSmithKline’s expert witness
testimony, the majority feel there is substantial evidence that the jury
could have relied upon to find induced infringement.72

67 GlaxoSmithKline LLC v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 7 F.4th 1320, 1333–34 (Fed. Cir.
2021) (quoting Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 915
(2005)).
68 Id. at 1334 (emphasis added) (describing also that in forming its decision, “[w]e
assume, as we must, that the jury found the post-MI LVD use infringes the ’000 patent, and
that Teva’s label contained instructions encouraging prescribing carvedilol in a manner
that infringes the ’000 patent”).
69 Id. at 1326 (emphasis omitted). The court stated that the “patented use was on the
generic label at all relevant times . . . therefore, Teva failed to carve out all patented
indications.” Id.
70 Id. at 1335 (noting as evidence Teva’s product catalogs describing the generic
tablets as the “therapeutic equivalent” to the brand compound, and citing to “two relevant
press releases” located in the Joint Appendix); Corrected Non-Confidential Joint Appendix
Volume I of II at Appx6347, GlaxoSmithKline LLC v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 976 F.3d
1347 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (No. 18-1976, -2023) (a press release dated 2004 stating the generic
tablets “are the AB-rated generic equivalent of GlaxoSmithKline’s Coreg® Tablets and are
indicated for treatment of heart failure and hypertension”); id. at Appx6353 (a press release
dated 2007 stating the FDA granted approval of the ANDA to market the generic version
“of GlaxoSmithKline’s cardiovascular agent Coreg®”); U.S. Patent No. RE40,000 (showing
the patent reissued January 8, 2008).
71 GlaxoSmithKline, 7 F.4th at 1337.
72 Id. at 1337–38.

2022]

BEEFING UP SKINNY LABELS

1721

In her dissent, Circuit Judge73 Prost recognized the substantial
lack of evidence that the jury purportedly relied on. She noted that:
[GlaxoSmithKline] alleged that, even though Teva’s skinny label
carved out the very use—indeed, the only use—that GSK said was
patented, the label showed that Teva intended to encourage an
infringing use. GSK also supported its inducement case by pointing
to two cursory, pre-patent press releases that announced Teva’s
drug’s approval (or “tentative” approval) and called it the generic
equivalent of GSK’s brand drug Coreg.
The evidence of
inducement—i.e., that Teva had culpable intent to encourage
infringement and that its skinny label or press releases caused
doctors’ prescribing practices—was thin to nonexistent. But a jury
found Teva liable all the same. This sometimes happens. And
when it does, there is a remedy: a court will reverse a jury’s verdict
if there is insufficient evidence to support it. The experienced trial
judge sensibly did just that.74

This split decision is notable in part for the ardency with which Circuit
Judge Prost expounds her opinion that the court should not have
upheld the jury’s verdict due to the lack of substantial evidence. It is
clear that both Circuit Judge Prost and District Judge Stark—the judge
having the most proximate relationship to the factual information
provided to the jury throughout the case—feel there is insufficient
evidence for a jury to find induced infringement in this case.75 There
is also a clear concern that this case will lead to follow-along cases in
the future, since GlaxoSmithKline may have provided the groundwork
for brand manufacturers to pursue induced infringement where there
is any combination of a generic skinny label with any vague indication
that said generic is equivalent to the brand compound.76
In contrast, it appears that Chief Judge Moore and Circuit Judge
Newman stand behind the jury, showing hesitance to overturn the
jury’s decision, but without seeking to reevaluate the weight of the
evidence themselves.77 They also believe the district court judge
overreached by reevaluating de novo whether Teva’s actions actively

73 Though previously Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit, Circuit Judge Prost vacated
the position on May 21, 2021, prior to the rendering of the GlaxoSmithKline v. Teva decision.
Id. at 1323 n.**.
74 Id. at 1342 (Prost, J., dissenting).
75 Id.; GlaxoSmithKline LLC v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 3d 582, 589–90
(D. Del. 2018).
76 GlaxoSmithKline, 7 F.4th at 1359 (Prost J., dissenting) (Judge Prost criticizing “the
majority’s weakening of intentional encouragement (where describing an infringing use
piecemeal—or simply calling a product a ‘generic version’ or ‘generic equivalent’—is now
enough)”).
77 Id. at 1331 (majority opinion) (“The district court erred in reweighing the evidence
and finding against GSK following the jury’s verdict in its favor.”).
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induced others to infringe, since the opinion of the court is that this
aspect—like all other aspects of induced infringement—is a question
of fact.78
As discussed further in Part III, there is no requirement that all
elements of induced infringement be treated as questions of fact. If a
judge is in a better position to evaluate certain aspects of inducement,
it can enable a more balanced approach to deciding matters of
induced infringement. This would not be the first time the patent
litigation landscape has turned a practiced question of fact for the jury
into a question of law for the judge’s evaluation. Applying this line of
thinking to GSK v. Teva, it would have been well within the district
judge’s realm to evaluate the evidence of the generic skinny label and
Teva’s marketing materials to determine whether Teva had actively
induced others to infringe on GlaxoSmithKline’s patent.
III.

INDUCED INFRINGEMENT AS A MIXED QUESTION OF FACT AND
LAW

The Markman decision discussed further herein invites the
judicial system to consider whether elements of patent law are better
evaluated by the court, and also suggests some issues may be split such
that some factors are evaluated by the jury and others are evaluated by
the court. Part III will argue that the court—not the jury—should
decide whether there has been a sufficient showing that the alleged
inducer had the requisite intent that the acts it induced would actually
lead to direct patent infringement. Section III.A sets forth the
groundwork and introduces the argument that determining whether a
party had actual intent to induce others to infringe a patent should be
a question of law. Section III.B walks through the Markman decision
and maps a similar analysis to the issue at hand to evidence that the
Supreme Court’s prior considerations can result in finding that the
issue of intent to induce should be a question of law. Section III.C
provides a brief summary of the analysis from Section III.B and
responds to potential criticisms of this proposal.
A. Induced Infringement’s Partial Question of Law
One manner of resolving the issue of wayward juries having a
disproportionate impact on decisions of induced infringement would
be for the courts to treat portions of inducement as a question of law
rather than a question of fact. The notion that controversies in patent
78 Id. at 1330 (“Critically, the district court erred by treating this fact question—
whether the post-MI LVD indication instructs a physician to prescribe carvedilol for a
claimed use—as though it were a legal one for it to decide de novo.”).
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law ought to be treated as a mixed combination of fact and law is not
novel,79 and the concept of taking something that has been treated as
a question of fact for juries from their purview and giving it to the
courts is not a radical idea.80 While patent infringement is generally a
question of fact, there is an underlying question of law. For example,
where “there is no dispute as to the evidentiary facts . . . the question
of infringement resolves itself into one of law,” depending on
comparisons between the patent claims, the accused device, and the
application of the rule of equivalency.81 Where “facts are not in
dispute, infringement becomes a matter of law.”82
This is not to say that the jury ought not be involved in deciding
questions of induced infringement. It is not doubted that to
determine whether infringement occurred is a question of fact that
should be resolved by a jury,83 nor is it contested that, with induced
infringement specifically, there are factual issues that should be
considered by the factfinder. There exist, however, certain aspects
within the determination of induced infringement that are best
resolved by the court, and in patent law there is a long history of mixing
questions of law and questions of fact.84 Elements of induced
infringement may be treated akin to obviousness in patent law, which
is a question of law with a consideration of underlying factual bases.85
Because Congress has failed to provide clear guidance with
respect to the manner in which induced infringement is determined,
it is well within the Court’s power to provide the boundaries.86 Taking
any one element for determining induced infringement away from the
jury and giving it to the court would result in a more balanced inquiry
and uniform results, incorporating the default reverence given to the
jury while also considering the insights from the experienced and
knowledgeable court. The next logical step is evaluating whether any

79 Gugliuzza, supra note 25, at 607.
80 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388 (1996).
81 Kemart Corp. v. Printing Arts Rsch. Lab’ys, Inc., 201 F.2d 624, 627 (9th Cir. 1953);
see also Del Francia v. Stanthony Corp., 278 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1960); Hansen v. Colliver, 282
F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1960).
82 Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Computervision Corp., 680 F.2d 669, 671 (9th Cir. 1982),
aff’d on reh’g, 732 F.2d 888 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
83 Gugliuzza, supra note 25, at 634 (“Under longstanding Supreme Court precedent,
infringement is a question of fact for the jury.” (citing Markman, 517 U.S. at 384)).
84 See id. at 607.
85 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
86 Markman, 517 U.S. at 376 (holding “the interpretation of claim terms to be the
exclusive province of the court”); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)
(“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is.”).
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of the elements of induced infringement would better be decided by
the court rather than the jury.
As discussed in Section II.B, there are three elements to be
considered in evaluating whether induced infringement exists: (i) an
affirmative act by the alleged inducer that actually causes a direct act
of infringement;87 (ii) a specific intention to induce another party to
infringe the patent;88 and (iii) that the infringement by the other party
actually occurs.89 Currently, a finding of a specific intention to induce
another party to infringe a patent requires the alleged inducer have
actual knowledge of the patent and knowledge that the induced acts
would result in patent infringement.90 This Note recognizes that the
determination of whether a direct act of infringement actually
occurred is a question of fact that belongs to the jury.91 Similarly, it
seems the determination of whether the alleged inducer’s affirmative
act actually caused a direct act of infringement is best determined by
the jury weighing evidence provided by the parties.
However, this Note suggests that the question of whether the
alleged inducer intended and had knowledge that its induced act would
lead to infringement has underlying tones of maliciousness, and may
best be characterized as an issue that should rightly be determined by
the court. It is not sufficient to show that the alleged inducer had
87
[T]he legislative history of § 271(b) indicates that Congress did not intend to
impose liability on persons for activities not actually resulting in direct
infringement. . . . Since the term “actively induce infringement” is not clearly in
derogation of the common law of contributory infringement, this court must
conclude that Congress intended this term to cover situations in which actual
infringement results from “active inducement.”
Hautau v. Kearney & Trecker Corp., 179 F. Supp. 490, 492–93 (E.D. Mich. 1959).
88 Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 760 (2011) (“Although the
text of § 271(b) makes no mention of intent, we infer that at least some intent is required.
The term ‘induce’ means ‘[t]o lead on; to influence; to prevail on; to move by persuasion
or influence.’ Webster’s New International Dictionary 1269 (2d ed. 1945). The addition
of the adverb ‘actively’ suggests that the inducement must involve the taking of affirmative
steps to bring about the desired result, see id., at 27. When a person actively induces
another to take some action, the inducer obviously knows the action that he or she wishes
to bring about.”).
89 MOORE ET AL., supra note 11, at 19; see also infra, Section II.B. Induced infringement
under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) cannot be found unless an act of direct infringement under 35
U.S.C § 271(a) occurs. Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 572 U.S. 915, 917
(2014).
90 Global-Tech, 563 U.S. at 765–66.
91 To determine otherwise would be to directly conflict with the Supreme Court’s
teaching that whether or not infringement has occurred under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) is the
purview of the jury. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996)
(“[W]hether infringement occurred . . . ‘is a question of fact, to be submitted to a jury.’”
(quoting Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 338 (1854)).
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knowledge that some of its users may end up infringing the patent;
induced infringement requires intent to cause such action.92 Under
this proposed construction, as with the Markman decision, the statutory
right of trial by jury in patent infringement would still exist—it would
still be for the jury to decide whether or not infringement actually
occurred,93 and the jury would decide numerous of the other elements
of inducement as well.
With this novel evaluation of induced infringement, one of the
more contentious issues of GSK v. Teva could be determined by the
court and would be a question of law reviewable de novo. The judges
disagreed as to whether sufficient evidence existed for a jury to find
that Teva had knowledge its actions (i.e., providing a skinny label and
marketing materials) would actually lead to inducement to infringe
GlaxoSmithKline’s ’000 patent.94 By accepting this issue as a question
of law, decisions of induced infringement would become more
equitable and consistent.
B. Basis in Precedent: Markman
The Supreme Court has not yet considered if courts may
determine, as a matter of law, whether an alleged inducer intended
that its induced act would lead to infringement.95 However, this would
not be the first time the judiciary took an issue that had previously been
92 Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316 F.3d 1348, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(“[I]ntent to induce infringement cannot be inferred even when the defendant has actual
knowledge that some users of its product may be infringing the patent.”).
93 5 DONALD R. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 17.04, Lexis (database updated March
2022) (“[T]he Supreme Court confirmed that a person may not ‘be liable for inducing
infringement of a patent under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) when no one has directly infringed the
patent under § 271(a) or any other statutory provision.’” (quoting Limelight Networks, Inc.,
572 U.S. at 917)).
94 GlaxoSmithKline LLC v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 7 F.4th 1320, 1339–40 (Fed. Cir.
2021) (Chief Judge Moore and Circuit Judge Newman supporting the per curium decision
that there was sufficient evidence of causation to establish inducement); id. at 1342 (Prost,
J., dissenting) (Circuit Judge Prost arguing “[t]he evidence of inducement—i.e., that Teva
had culpable intent to encourage infringement and that its skinny label or press releases
caused doctors’ prescribing practices—was thin to nonexistent . . . a court will reverse a
jury’s verdict if there is insufficient evidence to support it.”); GlaxoSmithKline LLC v. Teva
Pharms. USA, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 3d 582, 591 (D. Del. 2018) (District Judge Stark finding
“that neither sufficient nor substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding of
inducement. . . . Without proof of causation, which is an essential element of GSK’s action,
a finding of inducement cannot stand”).
95 See Timothy R. Holbrook, The Supreme Court’s Quiet Revolution in Induced Patent
Infringement, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1007, 1007, 1011–25 (2016) (describing that only four
Supreme Court decisions have considered induced infringement—three generally dealing
with the mental state of knowingly inducing infringement, and one declining to expand the
scope of the statute to include divided infringement).

1726

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 97:4

considered a question of fact to be resolved by juries and gave it to the
courts as a question of law. In patent infringement, the interpretation
of patent claim terms had for a period of time been the duty of the
jury, but this practice was reversed in 1996 when the Supreme Court
unanimously held that “judges, not juries, are the better suited to find
the acquired meaning of patent terms” in Markman v. Westview
Instruments.96 Markman invites a similar analysis in other avenues of
patent law to determine whether something may better be considered
by courts, not juries.
Although there is a right to have a jury consider certain factual
questions—as codified in the Seventh Amendment—Markman
evidences the Supreme Court may characterize issues as questions of
law rather than fact.97 The judicial system has the power to resolve this
issue since Congress has not yet provided guidance.98 This Note
concerns only such evaluation of a single element of induced
infringement, not the broader catalogue of indirect infringement.
That analysis will be left to others who may be interested in such an
approach.
In assessing whether elements of an alleged inducer’s intent can
be analyzed as a question of law, this Note proposes evaluating the
matter in much the same manner that the Court did in Markman.
Subsection III.B.1 evaluates the Seventh Amendment right to a jury
trial, the “historical test” for determining whether such right exists for
a given matter, and the Court’s analysis in finding that a jury trial was
not necessary in questions of claim construction. Subsection III.B.2
mimics the evaluation of Markman by reviewing the application of the
historical test to the issue at hand. Subsection III.B.3 evaluates
additional factors described by the Markman decision in evaluating
whether an issue is a question of fact or a question of law.
1. The “Historical Test” and Markman’s Evaluation
The Seventh Amendment encapsulates the constitutional right to
a jury in certain civil cases.99 The Supreme Court has recognized that,
96 517 U.S. 370, 388 (1996).
97 U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by
a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to
the rules of the common law.”).
98 “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the
law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
99 U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by
a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to
the rules of the common law.”).
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“[s]ince Justice Story’s day” in the early 1800s, the Court has
“understood that ‘[t]he right of trial by jury thus preserved [by the
Seventh Amendment] is the right which existed under the English
common law when the Amendment was adopted.’”100 Where such right to
a jury trial did not exist under English common law when the Seventh
Amendment was ratified in 1791, there is no constitutional
requirement that a jury hear the issue:
Omission of provision for a jury has been upheld . . . on the
ground that the suit in question was not a suit at common law within
the meaning of the Amendment, or that the issues raised were not
particularly legal in nature. Where there is no direct historical
antecedent dating to the amendment’s adoption, the court may
also consider whether existing precedent and the sound
administration of justice favor resolution by judges or juries.101

Determining whether such jury right exists is called the “historical
test.”102 To apply the “historical test,” the Court first determines
whether the cause of action was directly or analogously tried at law at
the time of the passage of the Seventh Amendment, then the Court
evaluates “whether a particular issue occurring within a jury trial . . . is
itself necessarily a jury issue, the guarantee being essential to preserve
the right to a jury’s resolution of the ultimate dispute.”103
With regard to the first step of the historical test, Markman
recognized that the broader issue—patent infringement—was a matter
to be tried before a jury at the time the Seventh Amendment was
adopted.104 However, in looking to the second step of the historical
test, the Markman Court noted that “when, as here, the old practice
provides no clear answer . . . we are forced to make a judgment about the
scope of the Seventh Amendment guarantee without the benefit of any
foolproof test.”105 When past practice does not provide an obvious
answer, the Court must consider whether a jury trial is fundamental to
preserve a common-law right for that particular issue by looking at
historical context.106 In Markman, the Court—after evaluating the
100 Markman, 517 U.S. at 376 (second alteration in original) (emphasis added)
(quoting Balt. & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935)).
101 Amdt7.1.2.1 Identifying Cases Requiring a Jury Trial, CONST. ANNOTATED (footnote
omitted),
https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/essay/amdt7_1_2_1/
[https://perma.cc/P5RD-2HPG].
102 Markman, 517 U.S. at 376 (citing Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of
the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639, 640–43 (1973)).
103 Id. at 376–77 (emphasis added).
104 Id. at 377 (“[T]here is no dispute that infringement cases today must be tried to a
jury, as their predecessors were more than two centuries ago.”).
105 Id. (emphasis added).
106 Id. at 377–78 (“[T]he answer to the second question ‘must depend on whether the
jury must shoulder this responsibility as necessary to preserve the “substance of the common-law
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practice of courts at the time the Seventh Amendment was adopted—
held that “evidence of common-law practice at the time of the framing
does not entail application of the Seventh Amendment’s jury
guarantee to the construction of the claim” and thereafter evaluated
other parameters.107
This is not to say that there was no historical evidence that juries
were somehow involved in claim construction—to the contrary, there
are historical documents that suggest juries had some say in claim
construction arguments in some circumstances. What the Markman
decision highlights, however, is that where the past participation of
jury involvement is confusing or haphazard, the historical test is not
dispositive.108
The lack of clear historical precedent is a particular issue with
matters involving patent litigation. The Markman Court noted:
Although by 1791 more than a century had passed since the
enactment of the Statute of Monopolies, which provided that the
validity of any monopoly should be determined in accordance with
the common law, patent litigation had remained within the jurisdiction
of the Privy Council until 1752 and hence without the option of a jury
trial. Indeed, the state of patent law in the common-law courts
before 1800 led one historian to observe that “the reported cases
are destitute of any decision of importance. . . . At the end of the
eighteenth century, therefore, the Common Law Judges were left
to pick up the threads of the principles of law without the aid of
recent and reliable precedents.” Earlier writers expressed similar
discouragement at patent law’s amorphous character, and, as late
as the 1830’s, English commentators were irked by enduring
confusion in the field.109

Overall, the Markman Court found that there was a lack of
evidence of jury involvement in claim construction predating the
Seventh Amendment.110 Where there is a lack of historical clarity, “the
right of trial by jury.” Only those incidents which are regarded as fundamental, as inherent
in and of the essence of the system of trial by jury, are placed beyond the reach of the
legislature.’” (citations omitted) (quoting Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 426 (1987)).
107 Id. at 384.
108 Id. at 388 (“Where history and precedent provide no clear answers, functional
considerations also play their part in the choice between judge and jury to define terms of
art.”); id. at 380 (“Few of the case reports even touch upon the proper interpretation of
disputed terms in the specifications at issue and none demonstrates that the definition of
such a term was determined by the jury. This absence of an established practice should not
surprise us, given the primitive state of jury patent practice at the end of the 18th century,
when juries were still new to the field.” (footnote omitted) (citations omitted)).
109 Id. at 380–81 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting E.
Wyndham Hulme, On the Consideration of the Patent Grant, Past and Present, 13 L. Q. REV. 313,
318 (1897)).
110 Id. at 384.
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fact/law distinction at times has turned on a determination that, as a
matter of the sound administration of justice, one judicial actor is
better positioned than another to decide the issue in question.”111
Finding that neither history nor precedent provided a clear answer,
the Markman Court relied on its assessment of the interpretive skills of
both judge and jury and the policies that would be furthered by
allocating the responsibility, ultimately recognizing that, for claim
construction, “judges, not juries, are the better suited to find the
acquired meaning of patent terms.”112
The fact that the construction of claims may require a
consideration of factual evidence, such as expert witness testimony, did
not dissuade the Court from its decision—the Court felt a judge is in a
better position to consider the patent document and construe the
claims.113 Finally, as a matter of practical considerations, the Court
found it desirable to ensure uniformity in the interpretation of claims
and application of judgments.114
2. The Historical Test and Precedent, as Applied to Induced
Infringement
An application of the Markman methodology to the matter of
induced infringement suggests that the judge, not the jury, is in a
better position to decide whether an alleged inducer intended that its
induced act would lead to infringement. As with Markman, the first
step in evaluating this issue should be a consideration of the historical
test.115
As noted in subsection III.B.1, applying the historical test begins
by determining whether the broader cause of action was directly or
analogously tried at law in 1791.116 In induced infringement, as with
Markman’s claim construction, the cause of action is patent
infringement, and “there is no dispute that infringement cases today
must be tried to a jury, as their predecessors were more than two
centuries ago.”117
Thus the overall conclusion of whether
infringement exists should be tried before a jury.
Having reached a similar conclusion as the Markman Court here,
the “conclusion raises the second question, whether a particular issue
occurring within a jury trial . . . is itself necessarily a jury issue, the
111 Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985).
112 Markman, 517 U.S. at 384, 388.
113 Id. at 389–90.
114 Id. at 390–91.
115 Id. at 376 (citing Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh
Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639, 640–43 (1973)).
116 See id. at 376.
117 Id. at 377.
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guarantee being essential to preserve the right to a jury’s resolution of
the ultimate dispute.”118 As discussed in Section II.A, there was no
established historical practice, when the Seventh Amendment was
ratified, that the analysis of inducement was “a guaranteed jury
issue.”119 This finding is unsurprising considering “the primitive state
of jury patent practice at the end of the 18th century, when juries were
still new to the field,”120 and is compounded by the fact that the first
recognized case of indirect infringement was decided in 1871—a full
eighty years after the Seventh Amendment was ratified. Accordingly,
common-law practice at the time the Seventh Amendment was ratified
didn’t require the interpretation of inducement by a jury, nor is there
any indication of a jury’s involvement with an equivalent analysis.
Turning to the more relatively recent precedent, the first decision
concerning
indirect
infringement—Wallace
v.
Holmes—is
enlightening. There, Circuit Judge Woodruff unilaterally determined
that where a party has acted with “the express purpose of assisting, and
making profit by assisting, in a gross infringement of the complainants’
patent” while not technically infringing themselves, they will
nevertheless be held liable for such infringement.121 The decision does
not mention any consideration of a jury, and Judge Woodruff
consistently relies upon his personal ascertainment of the situation.122
Thus the first known case concerning indirect infringement did not
involve a jury, indicating this was not “a guaranteed jury issue.”123 Akin
to Markman, here, when the first actual practice of indirect
infringement analysis was brought about, it was the judge that analyzed
the action.124
As with Markman, application of the historical test and looking to
precedent do not clearly guarantee that the jury should determine
whether an alleged inducer intended other parties to infringe the
patent. There is no suggestion that juries had the responsibility during
the 18th century of analyzing inducement of infringement, and the
first example of any indirect infringement was assessed unilaterally by
the judge, not a jury. Therefore here, “common-law practice at the

118 Id. (emphasis added).
119 Id. at 380; see supra Section II.A.
120 Markman, 517 U.S. at 380.
121 Wallace v. Holmes, 29 F. Cas. 74, 79–80 (D. Conn. 1871).
122 Id. at 78–80. Judge Woodruff invokes his personal opinion six times, such as noting
that it is “in my judgment” that “defendants have no protection . . . against the charge of
infringement” and “I apprehend, that . . . the want of all the parties would be no defence.
Each is liable for all the damages.” Id.
123 Markman, 517 U.S. at 380.
124 Id. at 382 (placing importance on the fact that cases that “first reveal[ed] actual
practice” of claim construction evidenced it was “the judge construing the patent”).
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time of the framing does not entail application of the Seventh
Amendment’s jury guarantee to the” analysis of inducement.125
3. Additional Factors, as Applied to Induced Infringement
The Markman Court, finding no evidence of a jury guarantee from
the historic test and precedents turned to the consideration of “the
relative interpretive skills of judges and juries and the statutory policies
that ought to be furthered by the allocation” to evaluate whether claim
construction was to be determined by the judge or the jury.126 This
Note follows suit, and turns to functional considerations.
The question of whether one party intended to induce another
party to infringe a patent is an equitable issue. It has historically been
recognized that patent suits are an issue of equity as well as law.127
Specifically, the historical foundations of indirect infringement
considered it to be an issue that was “an expression both of law and
morals.”128 Past patent litigation practice provided that patent owners
who sought to sue in equity for the collection of both damages and an
injunction would not have a right to a jury trial, thus it was the judge’s
purview to render decisions concerning equitable matters.129 It wasn’t
until 1938 that questions concerning equity and law merged, enabling
patent owners seeking damages for infringement to bring their cases
before a jury.130
Where there is an equitable issue, it should be determined by the
judge rather than the jury, even if there are underlying issues
concerning fact.131 Though the power of traditional equity has
125 Id. at 384.
126 Id.; see also id. at 388 (“Where history and precedent provide no clear answers,
functional considerations also play their part in the choice between judge and jury . . . .”);
Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985) (noting that where there is a lack of historical
clarity, “the fact/law distinction at times has turned on a determination that, as a matter of
the sound administration of justice, one judicial actor is better positioned than another to
decide the issue in question”).
127 Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 17, 5 Stat. 117, 124.
128 Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 677 (1944) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting); Lourie, supra note 53, at 167, 172, 182, 184.
129 See Gugliuzza, supra note 25, at 616.
130 Id. at 617.
131 See Philippe Signore, On the Role of Juries in Patent Litigation (Part 1), 83 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 791, 797 (2001):
Certain questions of fact are part of an overall issue that is deemed to be
“equitable in nature.” An example of such an equitable issue is whether the
patentee committed inequitable conduct in front of the USPTO. This issue
involves questions of fact, such as whether the patentee intended to deceive the
USPTO, that would appear to be triable by a jury. The factual questions
underlying inequitable conduct, however, are sometimes reserved for the judge
because of the equitable nature of the overall issue.
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decreased over time,132 the federal courts nonetheless ought to
exercise equitable power in certain cases to achieve better justice. The
court is also better equipped to resolve ambiguities arising from
piecing together aspects of evidence. It is the court who can find an
explanation to “ambiguities arising from the description of external
things, by evidence in pais” rather than the jury, by virtue of the court’s
“peculiar knowledge and education to understand them.”133 A judge
presented with the evidence of both sides is better prepared than a jury
to balance the issues and consider whether an alleged inducer actually
intended that others infringe a patent, due to the training and
experience required for the position.
Additionally, the statutory policies advanced by providing the
judge with the power to make this determination are similar to those
advanced by the Markman Court. In Markman, the emphasized policy
matter was “the importance of uniformity in the treatment of a given
patent.”134 Such uniformity is also valuable with the issue of
inducement. When it is determined that intent to induce is not found
in a case between a patent owner and one alleged inducer, a second
case between the patent owner and a second alleged inducer should
likely reach the same conclusion if the facts are sufficiently similar. A
lack of uniformity results in more costly litigation and attempts to sway
a jury’s opinion concerning an aspect that should be an equitable issue
for the judge to decide.
Therefore, when considering the advancement of policies and
which member of the court is better equipped to determine the issue
of intent with respect to induced infringement, it is the judge—not the
jury—that ought to resolve this matter.
C. Intent to Induce Infringement: A Question of Law
The question of whether an alleged inducer actually intended to
induce a third party to directly infringe a patent should be a question
of law, determined by the judge rather than the jury. In treating the
analysis of this issue in much the same way as the Court did in
Markman, it is clear that there is no historical requirement or
precedent guaranteeing that a jury need consider this element of
Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
132 See Andrew Kull, Equity’s Atrophy, 97 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming May 2022)
(“[Traditional equity] was the power to modify and correct applicable legal rules, suitable
as the first-order resolution of the general run of cases, so as to do better justice between
particular parties in particular circumstances.”). See generally Symposium, The Nature of the
Federal Equity Power, 97 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming May 2022) (discussing equity
powers in the federal court system).
133 Bischoff v. Wethered, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 812, 815 (1869).
134 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390–91 (1996).
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inducement. Because indirect infringement is an equitable issue with
an underlying moral analysis, and because allowing the more
experienced judge to ascertain this matter will lead to more uniformity
in patent litigation, the issue is best resolved by the court.
Some may contend that to remove a consideration from the jury
and give it to the court is a high hurdle, and that a court cannot
consider aspects that belong to said jury.135 However, where it is at least
disputed whether the Seventh Amendment would provide a guarantee
of a jury trial to decide the issue, the judicial system ought to deliberate
whether a judge may be in a better position to resolve it. From the
above analysis, this Note recommends that the judiciary consider the
merits of allowing a judge—rather than a jury—to decide whether an
allegedly inducing party intended to induce another party to infringe a
patent. This is not to say that the jury would be removed altogether.
Indeed, the jury would still have the ultimate say of whether
infringement of the patent had actually occurred, preserving the role
that is traditionally reserved for the jury. This approach would simply
give the judge a means of providing a viewpoint directed to equity
within the specific issue of intent to induce.
Certain commentators are concerned that judges already wield
too much power and that their influence should be reined in.136
However, the decision of GSK v. Teva clearly shows it is the jury that
currently has all the power with respect to determining induced
infringement. This proposal—having the judge, rather than the jury,
decide the issue of intent to induce—results in a sharing of power
between the bodies. The jury continues to provide its insights with
regard to factual matters while the judge resolves the equitable, moral,
and legal issues; thus the judges are not being given too much power.
This is, instead, a manner of balancing what is currently an imbalanced
system.
Overall, the question of whether a party intended to induce
infringement of a patent should be determined by a judge. The
evolving understanding of patent law enables this consideration, and a
judge’s viewpoint would be beneficial to the determination of induced
infringement. This would result in a more balanced inquiry with
equitable and uniform results, allowing for the court to provide its
insights from the experienced and knowledgeable judge. Ultimately,
this approach would lead to the sound administration of justice.

135 See Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446 (1830).
136 See Gene Quinn, It May Be Time to Abolish the Federal Circuit, IPWATCHDOG (July 9,
2019),
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/07/09/may-time-abolish-federal-circuit
/id=111122/ [https://perma.cc/JVP5-J8X8].
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CONCLUSION
This Note contends that within the overall analysis of induced
infringement, a judge, rather than a jury, should decide as a matter of
law whether an alleged inducer intended to cause others to infringe a
patent. The Markman decision invites such reconsideration of
elements within patent law, and the analysis conducted within that
decision is informative with respect to induced infringement. Here,
the historical test and precedent do not evidence any guarantee under
the Seventh Amendment for a jury to consider the aspect of intent
within induced infringement. Because indirect infringement is an
equitable issue that judges—rather than juries—are better suited to
decide, and since overall policies would be better served by enabling
judges to do so, the determination of whether a party actually intended
to induce infringement should be treated as a question of law.
This will reintroduce an element of equity and fairness into the
considerations of looking at induced infringement, and will serve as a
buffer to prevent brand manufacturers from tying together tenuous
connections suggesting that generic manufacturers intended to
induce others to infringe on their patents. By requiring a stronger case
be brought against generic drug manufacturers, the application of
skinny labels may be strengthened, decreasing the concerns raised by
many following the decision of GlaxoSmithKline v. Teva.137
Would this proposal have any effect on the case of GSK v. Teva?
Perhaps. In Circuit Judge Prost’s dissent, she noted that “[t]he
evidence of inducement—i.e., that Teva had culpable intent to encourage
infringement and that its skinny label or press releases caused doctors’
prescribing practices—was thin to nonexistent.”138 It seems that, at
least in her opinion, there was not a sufficient showing of equitable
intent. The opinions of Chief Judge Moore and Judge Newman are
less discernable, but the majority opinion’s reliance on the supremacy
of the jury, rather than a reconsideration of the evidence, indicates
that it’s at least plausible the court would have come to a different
conclusion if they had reviewed intent as a question of law.
While it is important that brand manufacturers are able to protect
intellectual property rights to new methods of treatment, this should
not come at the cost of suppressing generics from entering the drug
market. The decision of GSK v. Teva could have a chilling effect on
the important generic market if the issues discussed in this Note are
not resolved.

137 See supra note 19.
138 Glaxosmithkline LLC v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 7 F.4th 1320, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2021)
(Prost, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).

